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Respeaking the Bill of Rights: A New Doctrine of
Incorporation
KURT T. LASH*
The incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment raises a host of textual, historical, and doctrinal difficulties. This is true
even if (especially if) we accept the Fourteenth Amendment as having made the
original Bill of Rights binding against the states. Does this mean we have two Bills
of Rights, one applicable against the federal government with a “1791” meaning
and a second applicable against the state governments with an “1868” meaning?
Do 1791 understandings carry forward into the 1868 amendment? Or do 1868
understandings of the Bill of Rights carry backward into the 1791 amendments
through the doctrine of “reverse incorporation”?
This essay proposes a new way to solve these conundrums and reconcile the
original Bill of Rights with the incorporated Bill of Rights and do so in a manner
consistent with a historically based understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the people adopted the Fourteenth Amendment into existence, they readopted
the original Bill of Rights, and did so in a manner that invested those original 1791
texts with new 1868 meanings. There is only one Bill of Rights—the one the people
spoke into existence in 1791 but then respoke in 1868. This respoken Bill of Rights
is now one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States which
neither state nor federal government may abridge.

* The author thanks Jason Mazzone, Richard Primus, and Kevin Walsh for their
comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
The current doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights—the manner by which
some or all of the ten 1791 amendments are made applicable to the states by way of
the Fourteenth Amendment—creates a number of interpretive conundrums. For
example, which text in the Fourteenth Amendment actually effects the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights—the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities
Clause?1 Do incorporated rights have the same meaning and scope as their
counterparts in the 1791 amendments,2 or does the original Free Speech Clause have
a different meaning and scope than the “incorporated” Free Speech Clause?3 If both
the 1791 amendments and their 1868 incorporated counterparts have the same
meaning, which meaning controls? Are the original 1791 meanings carried forward
into the 1868 amendment,4 or are the understandings of the people of 1868 carried
backward into the original Bill of Rights and applied against the federal government
by way of “reverse incorporation”?5

1. The current Supreme Court is divided on this issue. Compare, e.g., McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010) (plurality opinion) (basing incorporation of the Second
Amendment on the Due Process Clause), with id. at 813 (Thomas, J., concurring in part)
(relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the textual vehicle for incorporation). See
also AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (arguing that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and not the Due Process Clause incorporates the Bill of
Rights).
2. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408 (2010) (distinguishing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
3. For an argument that 1791 freedom of speech is quite different from the Court’s
incorporation doctrine on free speech, see Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First
Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246 (2017).
4. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 19–21 (1995) (arguing that the original
1791 federalist meaning of the Establishment Clause prevents its being incorporated into the
1868 Fourteenth Amendment).
5. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (reading Fourteenth Amendment
concepts of equality into the 1791 Due Process Clause). See also Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (defending the reverse incorporation approach
of Bolling); Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert and Amar: The Trouble

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 358

6/15/22 1:02 PM

2022]

RESPEAKING THE BILL OF RIGHTS

1441

These conundrums are especially perplexing for Fourteenth Amendment scholars
who seek to discover and apply the original meaning of constitutional text.6 Even if
the original 1868 understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the doctrine
of incorporation, how can that 1868 meaning be reconciled with what is likely to be
a very different public understanding of the Bill of Rights in 1791?7 Originalists seem
forced to either abandon originalism or accept a world in which we have two Bills of
Rights, one applicable against the federal government and invested with 1791
meanings and one incorporated against the states and invested with 1868 meanings.
This Essay proposes a new way to solve these conundrums and reconcile the
original Bill of Rights with the incorporated Bill of Rights and do so in a manner
consistent with a historically based understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the people adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, they readopted the original
Bill of Rights, and did so in a manner that invested those original 1791 texts with
new 1868 meanings. There is only one Freedom of Speech Clause—the one the
people spoke into existence in 1791 but then respoke in 1868. This respoken Bill of
Rights is now one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
which neither state nor federal government may abridge.
Reconceptualizing the doctrine of incorporation as involving a respeaking of the
Bill of Rights implicates both the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the post-Reconstruction enforcement of the Bill of Rights against
the federal government. Whatever the original meaning of the 1791 amendments, the
people of 1868 spoke those older rights into a new context, one reflecting decades of
battles over the meaning of the Bill of Rights and the importance of protecting those
rights against both federal and state abridgment. An originalist interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment not only calls for an 1868 understanding of provisions in the
Bill of Rights incorporated against the states by way of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, but it also requires an updated 1868 understanding of the Bill of Rights itself.
The 1868 respeaking of the Bill of Rights transforms the doctrine of “reverse
incorporation” from an antihistorical example of living constitutionalism into a
textually and historically based understanding of the original meaning of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also transforms “reverse incorporation” from a

with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (criticizing Amar’s intratextualist defense
of reverse incorporation).
6. Most scholars and judges believe that the original understanding of constitutional text
ought to play at least some role in constitutional interpretation. See The Nomination of Elena
Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan) (“we are all
originalists”). Although Kagan’s statement should not be understood as claiming scholars and
judges are the same kind of originalists, there is broad scholarly agreement that original
understanding plays a nontrivial role in determining the meaning and contemporary application
of constitutional text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public
Meaning Approach, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018); William Baude, Is Originalism Our
Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).
7. See Campbell, supra note 3 (arguing that the modern Supreme Court’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment free speech doctrine is altogether different from the original 1791
understanding of free expression).
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proposition about equal protection and a single clause of the Fifth Amendment into
a proposition about the entire content of the Bill of Rights.
I. “SPEAKING” CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
The American Constitution announces itself as an act of popular sovereignty. “We
the people of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this constitution.”8 A
theory of self-government which emerged in the United States between the
Revolution and the Founding, American popular sovereignty envisions that the
people communicate their will through the device of written constitutions and stand
apart from the ordinary institutions of government.9 Although the members of the
Philadelphia Constitutional Convention drafted a proposed constitution in 1787, this
document did not become the people’s Constitution until considered and ratified by
the people acting in conventions in the several states. As James Madison put it, the
proposed constitution was “nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were
breathed into it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state
conventions.”10
Madison’s biblical metaphor about the “voice of the people” is both striking and
apt. According to the book of Genesis, “the LORD God formed man of the dust of
the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living
soul.”11 Madison takes the biblical account of the creation of man and applies it to
the creation of the Constitution. As Adam was but clay until brought to life by the
breath of God so the proposed constitution was but a “dead letter” until the people
breathed life into the document by acting in their highest sovereign capacity in the
state ratifying conventions. In this way, words written by others became the words
of the people themselves spoken into legal existence by the act of ratification.
Under a system of popular sovereignty, the distinction between words-asproposed and words-as-ratified has important implications for the content of
constitutional law. Words are invested with legal validity only to the extent that they
represent the communicated will of the people themselves. Many originalist theorists
embrace this distinction and maintain that determining the meaning of a
constitutional communication requires determining the understanding held by those
with the sovereign authority to “speak” fundamental law into existence. For example,
whatever the understanding of those who drafted a proposed constitutional text, the
legally relevant understanding is that held by those with the authority to “breathe
life” into that text through the act of ratification. As Madison explained in the
expanded version of the above quote:

8. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphases added).
9. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–87, 344–45
(1969) (discussing the rise of popular sovereignty theory and its relationship to written
constitutions); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110 (1999) (discussing the theory of
American popular sovereignty and its relationship to originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation).
10. James Madison, speech of April 6, 1796, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 574 (Jack N.
Rakove, ed., 1999).
11. Genesis 2:7 (King James).
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[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who
formed our constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded
as the oracular guide in the expounding [of] the constitution. As the
instrument came from them, it was nothing more than the draught of a
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into
it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state
conventions. If we were to look therefore, for the meaning of the
instrument, beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it not in
the general convention, which proposed, but in the state conventions,
which accepted and ratified the constitution.12
Madison’s distinction between the understanding of the drafters and the
understanding of the ratifiers is echoed in contemporary scholarly debates regarding
the original meaning of the Constitution. Scholars who adopt an originalist
methodology for determining the meaning of constitutional text commonly (though
not universally) distinguish the intentions of the framers from the understanding of
the ratifiers.13 Although the publicly declared intentions and purposes of the framers
may have informed the understanding of the ratifiers, the principles of popular
sovereignty dictate that it is the understanding of the ratifiers that informs (indeed,
establishes) the legal validity of the text. Thus, to the degree that the drafters of a text
held a different understanding than the ratifiers, the legally operative understanding
must be that of the ratifiers. Only the latter counts as the voice of the people.14
The sovereign people not only have the right to establish their constitution, but
they also retain the right to alter or amend that constitution whenever they see fit.
This fundamental principle of popular sovereignty is announced in the Declaration
of Independence15 and constitutionalized in Article V of the Constitution.16
According to the supermajoritarian process set out in Article V, simply proposing a
constitutional text requires two-thirds support of both houses of Congress (or
national convention).17 Ratification requires an even higher three-quarter vote of
support from the people in the several states.18 Only those texts which survive this

12. Madison, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge Amy Coney Barrett to Be Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court: Questions for the Record Submitted October 16, 2020: Hearing
before
the
S.
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary,
116th
Cong.
(2020),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Barrett%20Responses%20to%20QFRs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4QK-U3RK](“I interpret the Constitution as binding law. And I interpret
its text to mean what the public understood it to mean when it was ratified.”).
15. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”).
16. U.S. CONST. art. V (setting out a two-step supermajoritarian process for amending the
Constitution).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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supermajoritarian process earn the right to be received as “higher law”—a
communication from the people themselves.19 This process allows the people to
speak into existence new constitutional ideas. They did so, for example, when they
restructured the original Article II presidential election process through the adoption
of the Twelfth Amendment.20
II. RESPEAKING CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
Occasionally, the people “respeak” portions of the original Constitution and either
invest those words with new meaning or clarify their proper interpretation. This
occurred when the people ratified the Eleventh Amendment. Article III of the original
Constitution declares that “[t]he judicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”21 In 1795, the people respoke the opening words of
Article III when they ratified the text of the Eleventh Amendment which declares:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”22
These opening words of the Eleventh Amendment “respeak” the original opening
language of Article III and invest those 1787 words with a 1795 meaning. The people
added the Eleventh Amendment in response to the actions of Article III judges, who
had construed the judicial power to allow out of state citizens to sue nonconsenting
states in federal court.23 The people swiftly responded by ratifying an amendment
which self-consciously respoke the words of Article III and declared their sovereign
will that the words “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed”
in a forbidden manner.
Whether one views the Eleventh Amendment as clarifying the original meaning
of the language of Article III or as establishing a new construction of the same words,
the people’s 1795 understanding of “the judicial power” trumps any contrary
understanding of the same words held by the people of 1787. The Eleventh
Amendment is an example of the people exercising their sovereign right to respeak
constitutional language and invest old words with specific and potentially new
meaning.
A similar “respeaking” occurred when the people ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment. The language of that amendment is based on the language of Article 6
of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance which declared: “There shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”24

19. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1993).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
23. For a discussion of the events leading to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, see
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background
Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577 (2009).
24. NW. ORDINANCE OF 1787 art. 6.
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Prior to the Civil War, abolitionist opponents to slavery repeatedly quoted the
language of the Northwest Ordinance as an example of the founding generation’s
opposition to holding persons as property.25 According to abolitionists, the
Ordinance was evidence that neither the founders nor their Constitution demanded
the continued existence of slavery. In 1865, Republican members of Congress
embraced the pro-freedom theories of constitutional abolitionists like Frederick
Douglass,26 and they self-consciously chose the language of the Northwest
Ordinance as the textual guide to framing Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Here are the two texts side by side: Northwest Ordinance: “There shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment
of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”27 Thirteenth
Amendment: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”28
In transforming the language of the Northwest Ordinance into the language of a
constitutional amendment, the people invested 1787 language with 1865 meaning.
Antebellum courts had construed the language of the original Northwest Ordinance
as banning the importation of new slaves into the territory, not as emancipating those
slaves already living in the territory.29 When the people of 1865 spoke these words
through their ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, they understood
these words as immediately freeing every enslaved person throughout the United
States.
There is no obvious semantic difference between the Ordinance’s declaration that
“[t]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude”30 and the Thirteenth
Amendment’s demand that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall
exist.”31 There was, and is, however, a dramatic difference in the historical context
in which those phrases were communicated. The people who passed the original
Ordinance were willing to tolerate the existence of slavery on American soil. The
people who spoke very similar words in 1865 had lived through decades of public
debate over slavery and the loss of over half a million Americans in a bloody civil
war. This older language, when used by a new people in this new context,
communicated the complete eradication of chattel slavery from the soil of the United
States.32

25. See, e.g., 33 Annals of Cong. 1170–72 (1819); Liberty Party Platform (Aug. 30, 1843),
in THE LIBERTY PARTY, 1840–1848: ANTISLAVERY THIRD-PARTY POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES 315, 317 (La. State Univ. Press, 2009).
26. See Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-slavery or
Anti-slavery? (Mar. 26, 1860), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467–80
(Philip S. Foner, ed. 1950).
27. NW. ORDINANCE OF 1787 art. 6.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1479, 1479–
83, 1487–90 (1984) (drafting debates discussing the use of the Ordinance’s language in the
proposed amendment).
29. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 356 (2005).
30. NW. ORDINANCE OF 1787 art. 6, (emphasis added).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added).
32. See generally REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, THE FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR: JAMES
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The adoption of the Eleventh and Thirteenth Amendments are examples of how
the sovereign people can respeak legal texts and invest old language with new
meaning. A similar respeaking occurred when the people ratified the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 2 of that amendment expressly respeaks, removes,
and replaces portions of the original text of Article I, Section 2.
Here is the original text of Article I, Section 2:
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several states which
may be included within this union, according to their respective
numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of
free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.33
This older text took on new and unanticipated importance when the people ratified
the Thirteenth Amendment. By abolishing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment
nullified that part of Article I which counted enslaved persons as three-fifths of a
person for the purposes of representation. After 1865, four million formerly enslaved
people now counted as five-fifths of a person for the purposes of congressional
representation. This created an enormous political problem for 1866 Republicans.
When representatives from the former rebel states returned to the seats they had
vacated four years earlier, it was possible they would do so in larger number than
before the Civil War. In order to prevent this, the Republicans of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress refused to readmit any representatives from the former Confederate States
until the people first ratified an amendment that prevented such an unjust political
windfall for the former states of the Confederacy. This was accomplished by Section
2 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment which declares:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.34
Section 2 solved the problem of the returning southern Democrats by reducing their
representation to the degree that the former rebel states refused to give freedmen the
right to vote. Section 2 does not expressly declare that it is respeaking, repealing, and

MITCHELL ASHLEY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF RECONSTRUCTION (2018) (discussing the
origins and original understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphases added).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphases added).
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replacing portions of the original text of Section 2 of Article I. Nevertheless, that is
the necessarily implied effect of the text.35
In sum, we know that the sovereign people have “respoken” legal and
constitutional texts in the past.36 We also know that Reconstruction-era Americans
engaged in “respeaking” texts, both in Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and
in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the next section, I explain why there
is good reason to think that the people of 1868 also respoke older legal texts when
they ratified Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF SECTION ONE AS RESPEAKING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains four separate provisions. The
first two address the rights of “citizens of the United States,” while the third and
fourth address the rights of “persons.” Thus:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.37
According to the judicially created doctrine called “substantive due process,”
rights originally listed in the first eight amendments (which originally bound only
the federal government) are “incorporated” against the states by way of a
“substantive” reading of the Due Process Clause.38 Few scholars (and, likely, few
judges39) find this to be a plausible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

35. Implied effects in this case should be understood as an aspect of what Lawrence Solum
refers to as “constitutional implicature,” or the idea that the words may communicate more
meaning than just that expressly stated. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, 172
(Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Papers Series No. 07-24, 2008). In the case above, the text
of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not have language expressly repealing the
language of Article I, but by echoing its subject (and, in some aspects, using the same words)
Section 2 necessarily implies the repeal and replacement of the earlier text.
36. Additional examples would include the Seventeenth Amendment which respoke
sections of Article I, Section 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each state, chosen by the legislatures thereof. . . .” (emphasis added)). See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each state, elected by the people thereof. . . .” (emphasis added)).
37. Id. (emphases added).
38. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (“With only ‘a handful’ of
exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
incorporates the protections contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the
States.” (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010))).
39. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 813 (Thomas, J., concurring with the judgment) (relying
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Process Clause.40 Instead, most constitutional historians (and some Supreme Court
justices) believe that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the more plausible textual
vehicle for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights.41 As I explain below, if this view
is correct, then it means that when the people of 1868 declared that states cannot
abridge “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” they
effectively respoke the Bill of Rights and invested those words with a broader
meaning than had been the case in 1791.42
The original meaning of the Bill of Rights had to be reshaped before these 1791
provisions could be applied against the States. At the time of the Founding, the Bill
of Rights represented the people’s commitment to the structural principle of
federalism.43 The Bill of Rights bound only the federal government and left the
people in the states free, as a matter of constitutional right, to pass laws establishing
religion, limiting the exercise of religion, or punishing seditious speech.44 It was only
Congress that could make no law respecting these subjects. When read in
conjunction with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the Bill of Rights stood as a
reminder to courts of law that the federal government had only limited delegated
power, with all nondelegated powers and rights retained by the people in the several
states.45
If the people of 1868 understood the words “privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States” to include the personal rights listed in the 1791 Bill of Rights,
then this means that those people held a very different understanding of the Bill of
Rights than did the people of 1791. Rather than understanding the words of the Bill
of Rights as securing the interests of the several states, the people of 1868 understood

on the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the textual vehicle for incorporation); Timbs, 139 S.
Ct. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“As an original matter, I acknowledge, the appropriate
vehicle for incorporation may well be the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause, rather than, as this Court has long assumed, the Due Process Clause.”).
40. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1675–80 (2012) (discussing the modern scholarly criticism of
the doctrine of “substantive due process”).
41. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 1, at 166.
42. Although some scholars argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates
only some, but not all, of the 1791 amendments, see, e.g., AMAR, supra note 1, at 248, nothing
about this possibility affects the argument in this Essay regarding the respeaking of any of the
Bill of Rights.
43. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 28–31 (1999). Securing a
provision retaining the rights and powers of the several states was one of the primary purposes
behind calls for the addition of a Bill of Rights. In the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention,
for example, Samuel Adams explained that adding a provision “declar[ing] that all powers not
expressly delegated to Congress, are reserved to the several States to be by them exercised”
would be itself “a summary of a bill of rights.” Samuel Adams, Massachusetts Convention
Debates (Feb. 1, 1788), in VI THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1390, 1395 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000) [hereinafter
DHRC].
44. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
45. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Speech Opposing the Bank of the United States, in
MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 489 (describing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as
jointly calling for a limited construction of federal power).
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those same words as securing the rights of national citizenship.46 Accordingly, when
the people spoke the Privileges or Immunities Clause into existence, they used a
phrase that they understood included the privileges and immunities listed in the Bill
of Rights, but which invested these older words with new meanings. It is as if the
people of 1868 lifted up the original 1791 Bill of Rights and set them down again
upon a new 1868 foundation.
Understanding the words of the Bill of Rights as being “respoken” by a different
people in a different historical context allows us to understand how old words can
take on new meaning. For example, there is good reason to believe that the 1791
people’s understanding of “freedom of press” was quite different than that held by
the people of 1868.47 Even if the original Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses
communicated nothing more than freedom from prior restraints,48 the suppression of
free expression under slavery may have generated a far broader understanding of the
rights of free expression among the Reconstruction Republicans who framed and
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.49
The same would be true of the Establishment Clause.50 It is possible that the
original meaning of the Establishment Clause prohibited federal establishments
while simultaneously protecting state religious establishments from federal
interference.51 If so, this seems to render the Establishment Clause an inappropriate
candidate for incorporation against the states.52 This original federalism-based
reading of the Clause, however, may have faded away between the time of the
Founding and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. If so, then it is possible
that the people of 1868 understood the words of the Establishment Clause as
declaring a principle of constitutional immunity from all religious establishments that
is as applicable against the state governments as it is against the federal
government.53

46. See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 277–79 (2014). This new understanding did not involve
an abandonment of federalism, it reconceptualized federalism as a constitutional principle
advancing national liberty. Republican abolitionists, for example, embraced federalism and
used its principles to deny federal power to pass the Fugitive Slave Acts and secure the right
of northern states to oppose slavery. See, e.g., DAILY GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1852).
47. Compare, e.g., Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J.
246 (2017) (arguing that the people of 1791 held a far narrower understanding of free speech
than we do today), with MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) (arguing
that the people of 1868 held far broader views of freedom of expression than did the people in
1791).
48. See LEVY, supra note 43, at 123.
49. CURTIS, supra note 47, at 357.
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion . . . .”).
51. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 41.
52. See id.
53. For a discussion of the 1868 understanding of the First Amendment Establishment
Clause, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995).
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In sum, for those who believe the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
is relevant to contemporary application of constitutional text, the meaning of the
“incorporated” Bill of Rights is the meaning held by the people of 1868. The original
rights were respoken and, potentially, reshaped.
IV. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION ONE AS RESPEAKING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Thus far, I have discussed the second sentence of Section 1 as involving a
respeaking of earlier constitutional texts. But if the second sentence involves a
respeaking, then so does the first sentence of Section 1. Declared by the same people
at the same time, these two sentences both speak about the “citizens of the United
States.” This repeated language must be read in pari materia. When these two
sentences are read in conjunction, it appears that people have respoken the Bill of
Rights in a manner that affects the post-Fourteenth Amendment enforcement of the
Bill of Rights against the federal government as much as the states.
The opening sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares: “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”54 This
sentence announced something new under the constitutional sun.
The original Constitution did not contain a clause defining national citizenship. It
neither defined national citizenship nor declared whether national citizenship was
attended by any rights, privileges, or immunities. This omission became a matter of
substantial debate during the antebellum period and was one of the central issues in
the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.55 Even Union officials during the Civil
War acknowledged that the original Constitution did not expressly declare the nature
and substance of national citizenship.56
This original constitutional omission did not prevent antebellum abolitionist
Republicans from calling for a new understanding of the rights of national
citizenship. According to Joel Tiffany in his 1849 Treatise on the Unconstitutionality
of American Slavery,57 “the privileges and immunities which the American citizen
has a right to demand of the Federal Government,”58 were those “guaranteed to him
by the Federal Constitution,”59 including
the right of petition,—the right to keep and bear arms, the right to be
secure from all unwarrantable seizures and searches,—the right to
demand, and have a presentment, or indictment found by a grand jury
before he shall be held to answer to any criminal charge,—the right to be
informed beforehand of the nature and cause of accusation against him,
the right to a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his peers,—

54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
55. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
56. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Opinion Letter on Citizenship (Nov. 29, 1862).
57. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
(1849). According to Akhil Amar, “Tiffany’s Treatise became a basic handbook for many
Republicans who later served in the Thirty-ninth Congress.” AMAR, supra note 1, at 263.
58. TIFFANY, supra note 57, at 87.
59. Id. at 57.
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the right to confront those who testify against him,—the right to have
compulsory process to bring in his witnesses,—the right to demand and
have counsel for his defence, the right to be exempt from excessive bail,
or fines, &c., from cruel and unusual punishments, or from being twice
jeopardized for the same offence.60
To Tiffany, the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States included
the rights enumerated in the 1791 Bill of Rights—rights that Tiffany insisted should
be viewed as binding upon the states.61 This same view was shared by the man who
drafted the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, John
Bingham. According to Bingham, “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in
the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”62
This is not the place to canvass the historical evidence supporting the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
Section 1.63 The point is that there is a substantial record of antebellum and
Reconstruction-era Republicans describing the “privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States” as including the rights listed in the Bill of Rights.
When the people of 1868 spoke into constitutional existence a group they named
the “citizens of the United States,” they referred to this group twice. First, they named
and defined “citizens of the United States” in the first sentence of Section 1.64 Then,
in the second sentence, they declared that states could not abridge the privileges or
immunities of these newly announced “citizens of the United States.”65
By definition, the “citizens of the United States” named in sentence one hold the
same privileges and immunities that, according to sentence two, states must not
abridge. If it is correct that the second sentence applies a “respoken” (and reshaped)
Bill of Rights against the states because such are the “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States,” then these same respoken rights equally bind the
federal government for the same reason—because they are the “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.” This would be true even if the second
sentence of Section 1 did not exist, since the people of 1868 understood the term
“citizens of the United States” referred to a group holding certain privileges and
immunities. Our understanding of the first sentence is assisted by the historical
evidence regarding the second sentence, but the legal meaning of the first sentence
is not dependent on the second sentence.
To the people of 1868, the term “citizen of the United States” was thick with
meaning.66 It included a panoply of textually enumerated rights—words originally

60. Id. at 99.
61. Id. at 117.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871).
63. For important discussions of the historical sources supporting incorporation of the Bill
of Rights, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1990); AMAR, supra note 1.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1.
65. Id.
66. See MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018).
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added by the people of 1791, but now spoken into existence by the people of 1868
and carrying an 1868 meaning. The ratification of the first two sentences of Section
1 thus had the effect of updating and reshaping the meaning of the 1791 Bill of Rights
in a manner that equally bound both state and federal governments—neither of which
have the constitutional authority to abridge “the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.”
Once we understand the first two sentences of Section 1 as jointly speaking into
constitutional existence “citizens of the United States” with 1868 understandings of
the rights inherent in the status of national citizenship, we can clarify the meaning of
these sentences by rewriting them as declaring:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the
United States who hold the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship, such as those listed in the Bill of Rights as we the people of
1868 understand the Bill of Rights.
Henceforth, neither state nor federal government shall make or enforce
any law abridging these 1868-informed privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.
There is no need here to fully develop how the Fourteenth Amendment modified
the original understanding of the 1791 amendments and how that understanding
might bind the federal government. My claim here is simply that the people of 1868
believed that citizens of the United States had one Bill of Rights, and they
communicated words that made this 1868 understanding of that Bill enforceable
against both state and federal governments.
V. RESPEAKING THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE CONUNDRUMS OF INCORPORATION
Understanding the opening two sentences of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
people of 1868 respeaking the Bill of Rights solves a number of interpretive
conundrums, particularly for those committed to a historically grounded
interpretation of constitutional text. In terms of the doctrine of incorporation, this
approach supports the insights of most contemporary constitutional historians who
view the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the proper textual vehicle for
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.67 It suggests, however, that the meaning of these
incorporated rights should be that held by the people who ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, not those who ratified the original Bill of Rights.
The approach also places the seemingly ahistorical theory of “reverse
incorporation” on solid textual and historical ground.68 There is nothing historically
backward about investing the post-Fourteenth Amendment Bill of Rights with the
understanding of the people who respoke that Bill of Rights in 1868. Reconstructionera Americans exercised their sovereign right to alter their original Constitution and

67. See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v.
Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159 (2012).
68. For a discussion of the scholarly debates over reverse incorporation and the impact of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the powers of the federal government, see Richard A. Primus,
Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (2004).
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invest old words with new meaning.69 This is not a pouring of new wine into old
wineskins (reverse incorporation), this pours new wine into new wineskins—a new
Bill of Rights for a newly constitutionalized group called the “citizens of the United
States.” Americans adopted their current Bill of Rights in 1868. They did so after
decades of public debate over the cruelty and injustice of slavery, the need to secure
equal rights, and the importance of marginalized voices in the creation and
enforcement of fundamental rights. The sovereign people who drove this
constitutional revolution included women’s rights groups,70 martyred abolitionists,71
black sailors,72 black soldiers,73 the enslaved and formerly enslaved,74 the majority
black South Carolina legislature,75 pro-freedom northern Republicans,76 and problack suffrage southern loyalists.77 The sovereign people who respoke the words of
the Bill of Rights had a new understanding of those words and how they bound both
federal and state governments. Our jurisprudence should reflect this new
understanding of our one and only Bill of Rights.

69. Another way to think about this is viewing the Fifth Amendment not as “reverse
incorporating” the Fourteenth Amendment, but as being altered or amended by the Fourteenth
Amendment. My thanks to Richard Primus for this insight. See also Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 408–10
(arguing that a “synthesis” of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment alters the meaning “due
process”).
70. See Women’s Loyal National League, Woman’s Emancipation Petition, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/WomensLoyalNationalLeague.p
df [https://perma.cc/J39E-U9ZZ]; Susan B. Anthony, Make the Slave’s Case Our Own, in
AMERICAN WOMEN: A LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GUIDE 380 (Sheridan Harvey et. al eds., Library
of Congress, 2001).
71. See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition
Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens,
44 UCLA. L. REV. 1109 (1997).
72. See JONES, supra note 66, at 50.
73. See AMAR, supra note 29, at 396 (“The story of black ballots begins with black
bullets.”); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE NEGRO’S CIVIL WAR: HOW AMERICAN BLACKS FELT
AND ACTED DURING THE WAR FOR THE UNION (1965).
74. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION
(2014) (discussing the role of slaves and former slaves in advancing abolition); see also
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or AntiSlavery?, in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITING 379, 380–90 (Philip S.
Foner ed., 1999).
75. See SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE JOURNAL, Spec. Sess., at 46 (1868) (majority black
legislative assembly voting to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment).
76. See H.R.J. Res. 127, 39th Cong., (1866).
77. See Frederick Douglass, Speech at Southern Loyalist Convention (Sept. 6, 1866), in
NATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Sept. 22, 1866, at 1.
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